CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 25 June 1992, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul O'Sullivan (Australia)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 626th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, His Excellency Dr. Edmundo Vargas, who will be addressing us today. Dr. Vargas is a well-known jurist, a specialist in international affairs with an outstanding academic background. He is at present member of the International Law Commission, a body to which he was recently elected, and was Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a post to which he contributed his wide knowledge of law together with his strong commitment to individual liberties. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest.

I wish also to use this opportunity to note the presence among us today of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, who is leaving the United Nations after having been Director of UNIDIR for the past five years. He has performed his duties in that sensitive position in an outstanding manner, having combined his knowledge of the subject of disarmament with his tact and competence as an able diplomat who knows our Conference very well, having served in it with distinction, if I may say so. He is now returning to his Foreign Service and I wish him, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, every success in his future responsibilities. I might also say that Ambassador Dhanaphala is an alumnus of the Australian Foreign Service training course, and I don't know whether his subsequent distinguished career is because of, or in spite of, that background, but I will let him address that.

As this is the first plenary meeting of the Australian presidency of the Conference, I should now like to make an opening statement.

I would like at the outset to pay tribute to the service to this Conference of my two predecessors, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria and Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina. Both gave exemplary demonstrations of what it means to be President of the Conference and to represent the interests of all its members. I will try to emulate the high standards of professionalism, competence, tolerance and mutual respect which they exhibited. I should also like to offer a formal word of welcome to our recently arrived colleagues, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan.

Both within and outside this Conference recent days and weeks have seen remarkable developments in the areas of disarmament and arms control. If you permit me, I would like to make some brief observations. The dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons agreed on 16 June by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin are the latest evidence of how profoundly our world has changed with the ending of the cold war. This is yet another proof that disarmament and arms control have to be viewed in a totally different perspective, as Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky reminded us on 14 May. The nuclear arms

(The President)

race, as it was so characterized, is clearly in a downward spiral at least as far as the two major possessors are concerned. It should result in the consolidation of strategic stability with the transition from multiple-warhead to single-warhead ICMBs and the lowering of total numbers of nuclear weapons.

In thinking about how to structure disarmament discussions, how to reform our agenda and our membership, we should not, in my view, overlook the continuing necessity of binding legal instruments that are soundly based on multilateral cooperation. The way in which that cooperation itself is accomplished will shape the psychologicl environment - the ideas - with which we work, and hence eventually the outcome in security and other related areas.

Of course even here a word of caution is necessary: the lifting of the restraints imposed by the cold war has led to contradictory results. On the one hand there is the wholly welcome improvement in relations between the United States and Russia. This is of vital importance to all of us because it lifts the nuclear cloud that has cast its dark and menacing shadow over our world for the past 40 years. It is truly worthwhile to note the invigorating boost and the opening of so many new possibilities that are provided by the cut-back in nuclear weapons and the ending of the cold war.

But even as, rightly, we celebrate this improvement in international relations, we cannot but be struck by the grim fact that ancient conflicts are forcing their way back on to our consciousness. The era of ideological competition may be over, but its ending appears to have unleashed in many regions ethnic, religious and social ferment. The economic disparities between nations are expanding not reducing, and as Ambassador Zahran reminded us last week, new and global issues are demanding the attention of senior decision makers.

In this world of increasing complexity, challenges to security may, for many countries, be increasing. And these challenges will be harder to handle because of the lingering after-effects of the cold war: the continuation of certain regional tensions; the excessive distribution of conventional arms; the decision of a few to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In this new world, the Conference on Disarmament should play a useful role. It should negotiate new instruments to create and embody norms of behaviour that lead to greater security at lower levels of armaments. It should institutionalize that multilateral cooperation to which I referred by producing agreements that would be practical instruments of inter-State cooperation and enhanced security. It should be characterized by flexible and creative approaches to arms control and disarmament. Whether it will indeed play such a role is the challenge for us in this Conference. It would be a fateful indicator of the prospects for international cooperation for instance if the CWC cannot be successfully adopted in our next session.

(The President)

But conversely, if we are indeed able, while respecting our differences and subordinating our maximum wishes, to reach a level of mutual tolerance that provides us with a concrete result in the form of a CWC, we will have sound reason to be optimistic about our capacity to make other wise judgements. We will send a signal that the Conference on Disarmament has a role to play in the new environment in which we find ourselves.

In this regard I should like to recall just how complex and demanding the task is of concluding the chemical weapons convention. As you know, I have had the opportunity of representing my Government in a number of bilateral and regional consultations about the CWC. In every case, my interlocutors have been struck by the ambition of the enterprise here: its technical complexity and political sensitivity. This agreement has been in gestation for so long precisely because it is difficult to achieve the combination of political leadership, industrial support and bureaucratic acceptance that is needed across so many countries and by so many interested individuals and groups.

Yet for all that, we are almost there. Six and a half decades after our predecessors could agree on a one-page Protocol banning, in effect, the first use of chemical weapons, we are on the verge of completing that job, making the ban comprehensive, providing for its verification and enhancing our security by this form of cooperation. There may indeed be some costs in implementing the complex text, as the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Velayati, frankly reminded us last week, and we should not ignore those costs. But there will also be the benefits of improved security and an equal commercial basis for trade in relevant chemicals. On balance it will be a good deal, and we will all be better off with this treaty than we would be without it.

In this connection I am pleased to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the results of a meeting of South-East Asia and South Pacific States held in Sydney over last week-end earlier this week. Twenty-four regional States met for the fourth meeting of the Chemical Weapons Regional Initiative launched by the Australian Prime Minister in 1988 to consider how to prepare for the implementation of the chemical weapons convention. At the conclusion of the seminar a statement was issued, and I have asked the secretariat to distribute it as a document of this Conference. In that statement all participants noted that their countries were not producers of chemical weapons and had no intention of developing, stockpiling, deploying or using such weapons. They confirmed that their Governments were giving favourable consideration to the call by the United Nations General Assembly for all States to commit themselves to becoming original States parties to the chemical weapons convention. In preparation for signature of the convention, and as a confidence-building exercise in the region, participants recommended that their Governments exchange statements containing such declarations on chemical-weapons-relevant matters as will be required under the chemical weapons convention and as provided for in WP.400/Rev.1.

(The President)

Because of our dialogue with our regional partners Australia is conscious of the demands which the CWC will place on developing countries, particularly those small States with limited bureaucratic and administrative resources. We stand ready to assist our regional colleagues in developing their knowledge and understanding of the convention and in developing appropriate legislative and administrative responses in order to discharge their obligations effectively. Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, has said to our neighbours that costs alone should not be a reason for any regional State to decide against participation in the Convention.

For the immediate future, of course, we have specific tasks. We now have, thanks to the great work of Ambassador von Wagner and his team, a draft chemical weapons convention. We will need to consider it together during the coming inter-sessional period and then exchange views about it on our resumption of formal meetings on 20 July. We have had yesterday, and will have later today and tomorrow, the opportunity to hear Ambassador von Wagner explain the contents and the balance of his draft. We are going to have to come to grips with some difficult choices, putting aside what any individual State might prefer in the interests of the collective good. There is no doubt that we are now at one of those points where individuals, international institutions and national Governments have to find common ground even if some pain is involved.

In this respect Senator Evans commented earlier today, and I quote him: "While WP.400/Rev.1 is not in every respect our preferred outcome, ... that is the nature of any compromise text. Everyone will have to give up some of their ideal positions. While reserving final judgement, I believe that this text will be effective in providing a convention which dramatically advances the cause of global disarmament. The world community must seize this opportunity. No one will claim that the most complex and instrusive international instrument ever established, and the CW convention will be just that, is going to be perfect. But it can and will provide practical means, for the first time ever, for the international community to prevent the production, acquisition, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons." That concludes my statement.

I would like to recall that today, immediately following the plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have on my list of speakers for this meeting the representatives of Chile, Canada, Finland and Myanmar. I now give the floor to His Excellency the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, Dr. Edmundo Vargas.

Mr. VARGAS (Chile) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to address this meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when you are taking up the post of president of this important body on behalf of Australia, with which we share an active presence in the Pacific Ocean, which we wish to convert into a genuine area of peace and cooperation. I also wish to pay tribute to the effective work accomplished by your predecessor, Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina, a country to which we are bound by so many very close ties.

The Conference has been, and will continue to be, the sole forum for negotiations on disarmament. In it, treaties have been prepared that represent very significant contributions to the concept of global security. After the discouraging lack of progress of recent years, a whole catalogue of opportunities has arisen to make progress resolutely towards limiting conventional weapons, banning weapons of mass destruction and strengthening comprehensive security. The shape of the world scenario has undergone marked change: the collapse of the walls that oppressed and divided, the virtual disappearance of the blocs, the incipient emergence of a new order whose scope and favourable repercussions are not yet clearly perceived by developing nations. Yet the enormous spiral of expenditure on the arms race, the deterioration of the environment and cruel and acute social tensions persist, while new ethnic and national conflicts arise. As the late Chilean Ambassador and political leader, Radomiro Tomic, said at the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament, "The contradictions between the longing for peace eagerly shared by mankind and the insane pace of the arms build-up - $2 million every minute! - and the blood-stained use of weapons on an increasingly threatening scale, particularly in the last 50 years, from the framework within which our deliberations on disarmament are taking place." From the very moment when those words were uttered, we have witnessed events that are major landmarks along the path towards a new concept of security, conceived as a shared value and one that is constantly expanding.

First of all, agreements arduously reached have been fully implemented. The 1987 Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, which set 1991 as the deadline for the total elimination of one category of nuclear weapons, has been fully observed. Others have helped stimulate broader negotiations in the multilateral area, as with the 1990 agreement between the United States and the former Soviet Union that laid down a timetable for the destruction of chemical weapons.

Second, the negotiations that culminated in the Treaty on strategic arms reductions (START), which brought about an almost unprecedented reduction in intercontinental nuclear delivery systems, were endorsed and confirmed by the Lisbon Protocol and subsequently received an even more decisive impetus with the recent agreement between Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with parameters which would have been unimaginable even for experts until just recently.

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Third, the extraordinary progress in the area of European security based on the Treaty on conventional forces and the changes that have occurred in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which, as it incorporates ever more fully the values that are shared by all its member States, is going to occupy an ever more preponderant role in the international equilibrium.

Fourth, a revaluation of denuclearized zones, becoming particularly obvious starting with the reunification of Germany, the policy of the Central European States and the decision by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to become non-nuclear-weapon States; the decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity last May and the initiative taken by President Mubarak of Egypt on the Middle East scene.

Fifth, a trend that can be seen through the statistics published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on the international arms trade, which shows that both the change in the international climate and the success of certain negotiations on disarmament, together with financial restrictions, have led to fewer opportunities for arms production and increased pressure for the conversion of the arms industry. In this connection, we attach particular importance to the international register of arms transfers, the creation of which has been approved by the General Assembly, and which in this Conference has been translated into the establishment of a specific ad hoc committee for this subject.

Sixth and last, I would not wish to omit mentioning that in the Latin American context very major steps have been taken in this area, such as the proposal by Chile, Argentina and Brazil to revitalize the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Mendoza Agreement, entered into by the same three countries, establishing a total and absolute ban on chemical and biological weapons.

In order for these trends to become a broad and irreversible process in efforts to secure disarmament, security and peace, it is essential to have both a clear idea of the targets that can realistically be aimed for and also a firm political will and a strategy appropriate to these ends. Frankly, I must say that at present we are noting with misgivings the lack of positive results, the mechanical repetition of resolutions without any visible follow-up, and the purely theoretical formulation of many items that, because they link disarmament to human rights and the development of justice and international cooperation, are crucial. Yet this has not led to a genuine modification of the threats to international security. The destructive role still being played by regional conflicts, the desperate economic emergencies in a number of regions of the world, including the situation in many African countries in which the emergency has become a permanent reality; the justified concern of the island countries of the Pacific at the effects of global warming; the unlimited cruelty of the hostilities that are taking place in former Yugoslavia; the persistence of the Middle East problem, which urgently calls for a just and comprehensive solution; and the difficulties facing the

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

nations with economies in transition that, freed from the yoke of centralization, are seeking both a return to their own identity and their necessary insertion into the international community. In this context it is essential to define the major priorities clearly. In this regard, we think that the present agenda and the procedures of the Conference on Disarmament urgently need to be brought into line with the new times following the end of the cold war, so that they really grapple with questions of vital importance for the enhancement of world security and stability.

Apart from the broad issue of general disarmament, I wish to underscore, as subjects of special urgency, the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, what are known as security assurances for non-nuclear States, the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the protection of outer space and the item that is being analysed by the Disarmament Commission relating to the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields.

The first priority is the approval of the convention that will ban chemical weapons once and for all. The Mendoza Agreement signed by my country along with Argentina and Brazil, to which I referred earlier, which has received major support from other Latin American countries in the region, offers further testimony of our will for peace. We wish to be among the first to sign the future convention on chemical weapons and to play an active role in its executive council, which must be formed with a feeling for regional balance and efficiency. We also think that the follow-up machinery and confidence-building measures provided for in the draft that was submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this week will constitute a decisive step in the revitalization of this very important body. In this connection, the efforts and the efficient work carried out by Ambassasdor von Wagner of Germany in discharging his function as Chairman of the aforesaid Committee deserve all the praise my country can offer. My Government will give very careful consideration to the draft, but as of now I can tell you that once these negotiations have been completed, crowning with success 24 years of illusions, ideals and efforts, Chile will be pleased to offer to host a regional seminar to provide information about the salient features of this agreement, particularly its verification and inspection machinery, so that countries are in a better position to implement this important convention.

Let us also recall that the cessation of nuclear testing was proposed for the first time in 1954 by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. Since then, major efforts have been made in the United Nations, in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, in PTBT review Conference and at the third and fourth NPT review conferences. Never has a measure limiting nuclear weapons been the object of so much dedication for so long and with so much persistence. It is our hope that the voluntary moratorium announced by Russia and France will become a permanent reality and that soon a treaty on a complete nuclear test ban can be agreed which will be the expression of a genuine and universal regime of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

The question of security assurances, which was considered during the NPT review conference, led to the five States that have admitted to possessing nuclear weapons demonstrating their readiness to reaffirm their previous unilateral declarations on the non-use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty. However, that statement was then considered insufficient. This fragile situation prompts the following thoughts on our part: in Latin America we have the good fortune to have managed to get these five States to sign Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, converting into a legally binding commitment that which in other regions is only a declaration of intent. Why not do the same with the Protocol to the Treaty of Rarotonga? Chile, as a Pacific country, calls on the nuclear Powers to confirm these negative assurances, which are also valid for the Antarctic and the Pacific Ocean, but which are of course valid also for the whole of man's universe.

In the past, there was a justified concern to avoid any military-type deployments in outer space. Today there is an equally justified concern about security in space. It has been calculated that there are at present approximately 6,500 space objects in orbit around the Earth which together weigh 2 million kilograms. But only about 6 per cent of them are really functional satellites, with the remainder falling into the category of space debris. In the face of other challenges, the question of space debris, within the broader concept of peaceful, secure and non-polluted outer space, does not have the same urgency as the above problems, but the international community included it in a somewhat selective way in the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its last session on the peaceful uses of outer space.

I have left to the end an aspect which is certainly not the last in terms of priorities, but it is the most complex one in the quest for a solution: the role of science and technology in disarmament, security and development. We have observed with interest the recent events in the framework of the technological development of weapons systems and the efforts that groups of countries are making to control the spread of nuclear technologies, dual technologies and ballistic missiles, through the "London Club" of nuclear suppliers, the Missile Technology Control Regime and also the group of the five major weapons exporters. We note that any regime for technology control is fragile and transitory by nature. Yet the progress of science and technology is an irresistible process that cannot be halted through treaties, agreements or national legislation.

The efforts that I have referred to are laudable, but they should be guided into multilateral channels. There will indeed be proliferation of nuclear weapons unless tests stop and all atomic arsenals are gradually disarmed. If progress is made towards their total prohibition, by means of regional agreements that would culminate in a multilateral convention similar to the one which seeks to prohibit chemical weapons, the objective of ending missile proliferation will have been attained.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

Technological development is closely connected with two other major concerns of mankind: the conversion of the arms industries, which presents enormous difficulties of all kinds, especially for the protection of the environment, as has been seen in the negotiations on chemical weapons. Another concern, which has been included, like the previous ones, in the chapter on the development of legal instruments in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development's Agenda 21, has to do with nuclear safety, which is seriously threatened by the obsolescence of nuclear plants, the dumping of nuclear waste in the oceans and the improper management of such waste. The debate on conversion runs the risk of being too theoretical. An interesting key is to be found in the prospect of the environmental applications of military technologies, as dealt with by the General Assembly in resolution 44/228. In Chile, the Minister of Defence, Dr. Patricio Rojas, scheduled a seminar which offered an opportunity to learn how defence agencies had compiled valuable data on oceans, marine ice, the Antarctic, atmospheric pollution, natural resources, the atmosphere, hydrological systems, soils, various ecosystems and other environmental processes. The relationship between the environment and military technologies was also of interest to the Rio conference that urged continuation of work to enhance protection of the environment from any mass attempts to cause destruction on a large scale in times of armed conflict. Chile is taking the necessary steps to accede to the 1977 Convention on environmental modification techniques, and is also prepared to participate in efforts to broaden the Geneva protocols and conventions on international humanitarian law in order to mitigate the impact of military activities on the environment.

Chile wants a planet that is free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear waste and toxic residues. On the initiative of my country, the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty designates Antarctica as an area devoted to peace and science. In the 200 miles of Chile's exclusive economic zone, as well as that of the other countries of the South Pacific system (Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and Panama), the dumping of nuclear and toxic wastes is absolutely banned. We took pains to uphold this same position at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. The initiative that we took together with Argentina and Brazil to strengthen the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been defined as a technical one, to modernize and adapt this extremely important instrument without altering its political integrity. If this objective is reached, Latin America will have made a very special contribution to the cause of non-proliferation through the development of safeguards and, above all, of the system of special inspections. The Treaty contains a provision which is a dead letter because of the lack of a procedure for organization and implementation, and of a corps of suitable inspectors. The new rules that have been proposed hand this task over to the International Atomic Energy Agency, but at the same time give it a mandate that goes beyond the limitations of the present safeguard agreements of the Vienna Agency enable it to cope with the challenge of possible violations of the NPT, Rarotonga or Tlatelolco, which up to now have had no realistic machinery for sanctions.

(Mr. Vargas, Chile)

A clear horizon, a protected environment, sustainable development founded on solidarity, outline the sources of our aspirations. But they imply following a new path, traced within a modulus of international cooperation, capable of creating greater rationality in the entire spectrum of inter-State relations and dispelling any possible threat scenarios. In order to make progress in this direction, there are certain essential principles to guide us. The first of them is that because of its universal nature, the United Nations is the most appropriate and, to a certain extent, the only appropriate place to forge a consensus on the major problems of security and disarmament. However, no initiative can be pursued properly if there is no change in the rigid procedures of United Nations bodies and this Conference of Disarmament, which are insufficiently democratic and representative. We can hardly speak of a new world order when the bodies entrusted with instituting it have no mandate and some of the subject-matter is dealt with in the secrecy of informal consultations. The subject of the expansion of the Conference brooks no further delay and my country, like others, has the legitimate right to become a full member of this body.

Another basic principle is related to the modern concept of security, which links it firmly to development, the eradication of poverty and the elimination of international tensions. In this connection, as a legal expert, I attach great importance to renunciation of the use of force, systems of peaceful settlement, peace-keeping operations and compliance with treaties and other international commitments. It is also necessary to appreciate the evolution of the strategic doctrine which leads us to the level of reasonable sufficiency for defence, conceived in the way which is most in keeping with the material capabilities and human resources of each nation.

This last argument is founded on the conviction that the new international order should be preceded by the preparation, at the regional level, of a set of measures that would increase confidence among all the members of each society. To this end, Chile wishes to propose that the possibility of convening in the near future a regional conference on mutual confidence-building and security-building measures should be studied in Latin America. Transparency in identification, analysis and decision-making when faced with shared opportunities; the strength provided by shared values in the defence of human rights and stability in democratic coexistence; and the shared perception by all the Governments of the region that Latin America, true to its tradition and destiny, must make its own irreplaceable contribution to the establishment of new structures, new practices and a new form of civilization which is being reborn after decades of suffering and adversity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, since this will be the first Canadian intervention since your assumption of the presidency, let me begin by expressing our pleasure that, at a really crucial phase of the work of the CD, we will be guided by someone of such proven skill and competence. Your term in office will see us through virtually the final phase of the CWC negotiations as well as the production of the major elements of our report to the forty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly - the technical part and the reports of the ad hoc committees, special coordinators, etc. Australia has already played a key role in the CWC process, not only in the past but earlier this year in pushing forward our work on the CWC through the tabling by Senator Evans of your model text, and also for example in Ron Morris' work on article VI verification and your own recent efforts as moderator. We in the Canadian delegation are confident that you will provide the determined leadership required during the coming key weeks of our work. I would also like to take this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation for the contributions of your two immediate predecessors, Ambassadors Semichi of Algeria and García Moritán of Argentina. Finally, I would like to say a special farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Rasaputram of Sri Lanka and Calovski of Yugoslavia, and to my friend Jayantha Dhanapala, with all of whom we in our delegation have had such excellent relations.

Clearly the achievement by the close of our work this year of an effective CW convention must continue to be our main collective priority. Canada's own commitment to that goal has been made perfectly clear already, through our long-standing and ongoing participation in the work of the ad hoc committee and its various subgroups, so ably and dynamically led by Ambassador von Wagner. Today, however, I am not going to speak about our work on the CWC. Instead, I shall focus on another equally, indeed possibly even more, important issue: that of nuclear weapons, the dangers of their proliferation, and the need for a nuclear test ban. In addressing these issues today I do so in the ironic context of the fact that, even as the second phase of our 1992 CD session draws to its close, it has not yet been possible for us to reach agreement on setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item.

Just over a month ago, on 21 May, the Canadian Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, delivered a commencement address to the graduating class of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. He used that occasion to outline a new seven-point plan for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is the essentials of that plan that I now intend to share with you.

Noting that the defeat of communism had opened the door to democracy but that it had also brought economic hardship to some 425 million people throughout Central and Eastern Europe, Mr. Mulroney stated that in Canada we sympathized with the magnitude of the challenge that President Yeltsin, President Kravchuk and others are struggling with as they try to lead their nations into democracy and economic reform simultaneously. He expressed the view that the overall Western response to these needs had so far at best been hesitant but that Canada had itself been active. To the end of 1991, Canada,

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with a relatively small population only approaching 28 million, had already disbursed over $1.6 billion in credits and aid to the former Soviet Union, the second highest per capita assistance of the G-7, exceeded only by that of Germany. In 1992, Canada was providng an amount approaching a further billion dollars, for a total of almost $2.5 billion in Canadian assistance. To promote exports by the countries of the former Soviet Union, Canada had gone beyond most-favoured-nation tariff levels and was granting preferential tariff treatment as low as zero tariffs in some categories.

The Prime Minister, however, also highlighted the fact that the distintegration of the Soviet Union had also raised the ominous spectre of ethnic conflict and of possible economic collapse. He considered that these factors, taken together, had also seriously multiplied the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Noting the magnitude of the economic problems Russia and the other States of the CIS now face, he suggested that the potential for ethnic conflict was an urgent, potentially dangerous problem for everyone, especially considering that some 25 million ethnic Russians live now as minorities in the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, that many borders there are in dispute, that the economy of the former Soviet Union had shrunk by 17 per cent last year and that in Russia it will fall back a further 15 or even 20 per cent this year. There was as well, he noted, religious ferment, ethnic hatreds that have boiled over and still a somewhat uneasy relationship between Kiev and Moscow. In our Prime Minister's view the greatest single threat to world peace today now comes potentially from the thousands of nuclear weapons stored in these suddently impoverished and politically volatile countries of the former Soviet Union. Vast amounts of nuclear-weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium are now stockpiled there. If one couples these facts with the nuclear ambitions of a few international pariah States, to use his words, the dangers are unmistakable. Canadians and people everywhere had applauded the earlier far-reaching nuclear weapons reduction moves by President Bush and President Yeltsin. In Canada's view it was urgent that the START cuts agreed upon in July 1991 be ratified and implemented as soon as possible, which is why we were also very pleased by the progress made on strategic weapons issues by President Bush in his recent meetings with President Kravchuk of the Ukraine and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. Last week's agreement between Presidents Bush and Yelsin on even deeper cuts in nuclear weapons arsenals was of such extraordinary significance that it virtually overshadowed another very important announcement, that of 15 June by the British Minister of Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, of the unilateral decision of the Government of the United Kingdom to reduce, and in some instances entirely eliminate, naval and maritime air tactical nuclear weapons. I am pleased to note that that statement has just been circulated as a CD document.

(Mr. Robertson, Canada)

While Canada heartily welcomes these moves, even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, by all the nuclear-weapons Powers, to the lowest possible level consistent with effective nuclear deterrence, are in our view still called for. We believe this would make good security and also economic sense for all concerned, including the United States, which Mr. Mulroney, in his statement, had suggested no doubt could find places at home to spend any eventual savings that might accrue from such cuts.

The Prime Minister then went on to state that Canada would be prepared to join in an international programme to assist the countries of the former Soviet Union in the destruction of nuclear weapons. We regarded the reduction of super-Power weapons stockpiles as vital for its own sake and as crucial to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear-weapons States. Nothing is more important in Canada's view than the prevention of such nuclear proliferation. There is no room at all for slippage on this issue. To give substance to this concern, Prime Minister Mulroney then outlined several important steps he suggested the world community should take to make sure such proliferation does not happen. These steps were as follows.

First, it is imperative that the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty regime be strengthened when the Treaty comes up for review in 1995. All countries must accede to it. And it must be extended indefinitely. To that end the Prime Minister stated that, as part of an effective international effort - I repeat, as part of an effective international effort - Canada would be prepared to terminate all of its economic cooperation programmes, including aid and tariff preferences, with any country, including the new republics of the former Soviet Union, that undermines the non-proliferation Treaty, through action or inaction.

Second, nuclear cheating must be stopped. To stop the cheating, the mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened and its resources increased. The budget of IAEA is currently some $180 million per year, or about half the cost of one B-1 bomber. Canada will support giving IAEA the teeth - the authority and the resources - to inspect any country at any time. We will also support United Nations Security Council action to force compliance with international rules, as is currently being done with respect to Iraq.

Third, controls must be tightened on the export of nuclear weapons technologies.

Fourth, the sale of nuclear brainpower to pariah States wishing to develop or strengthen their nuclear weapons potential must be stopped. It is extremely dangerous to world peace when highly skilled nuclear scientists, who in Russia now earn literally less than garbage collectors in the West, are likely to be driven by economic hardship to accept offers to work in rogue countries with the purpose of assisting them in putting together a nuclear weapons capability. The creation, under United States leadership, of

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international science and technology centres in the countries of the former Soviet Union to employ nuclear scientists and engineers is, therefore, in our view wise and timely. Canada is prepared to help lead in the funding and financing of such a centre in Kiev.

Fifth, security cooperation must be strengthened regionally so as to reduce the underlying causes of tension, particularly in global hot spots such as the Indian subcontinent, the Korean peninsula and in the Middle East.

Sixth, the basic bargain implicit in the non-proliferation Treaty is a commitment of the nuclear Powers to reduce nuclear weapons in return for a commitment by the non-nuclear Powers not to acquire any such weapons. The 1995 review conference must confirm that bargain. To pave the way, our Prime Minister suggested that it would be reasonable for all nuclear-weapons States to agree now on a moratorium on testing these weapons. In his view France deserved full marks for its unilateral moratorium announced in April.

Seventh and finally, it would also be reasonable for those States which have acquired nuclear weapons to give assurances to all those countries, including Canada, which have signed the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons States, that such weapons will never be used against them.

If progress could be made on these seven points, said Mr. Mulroney, that would give to all of us a much safer and better world.

In some respects these seven new proposals do no more than reflect long-standing Canadian policies in the nuclear non-proliferation field. In other aspects, however, they go much further than we have in the past. They are the manifestation of our real and serious concerns and the demonstration of a solid commitment by Canada to try to resolve those concerns, concerns which surely almost all of us who participate in the work of the CD must share. It is our hope that, with the support of like-minded countries from all regions of the world, it will indeed prove possible to make progress in an area, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, which threatens all of us, nuclear and non-nuclear States alike.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): Mr. President, the delegation of Finland associates itself with the words of pleasure expressed by the previous speakers to you, Sir, when you today assumed the presidency of this Conference.

I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book" which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1155). The "blue book" of the year is a joint report of laboratories which participated in the third round-robin test. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

The third round-robin test comprised two parts, an analytical laboratory exercise and a written study. The laboratory exercise simulated the kind of analyses that will be carried out in accredited laboratories under the future convention. The Netherlands undertook to prepare the samples. As samples in the future will have to be sent to accredited laboratories, a written study on procedures for sampling, sample preservation, packaging, coding, methods to guarantee sample integrity, transportation, and storage in laboratories was carried out as the second part of the third round-robin test. Both the analytical test and the written study on sampling and transportation were coordinated by Finland.

The aim of the laboratory exercise was to analyse and unambiguously identify scheduled compounds and related materials in three matrices: concrete, paint and rubber, associated with the inspection of a military facility. In addition, laboratories would report on the methods employed for analysis of these samples and the criteria and instrumental methods used for the identification and confirmation of the chemicals of interest. Only chemicals belonging to schedules 1-3 and any related chemicals for which agreed-upon identification criteria were met were to be reported to the coordinating laboratory.

The aim of the written study was to collect experiences and views of the participating laboratories on the aspects of sampling and transportation of samples. These topics are extremely important for the whole verification procedure.

The three sample matrices were spiked with chemicals belonging to the mustard family, agents and their degradation products. Chemical background was added to the samples to simulate a realistic situation in military facilities. The samples emphasized very well the difficulties involved in the identification of trace levels of chemicals in samples with high chemical background.

The laboratories knew that the samples were to simulate those collected at a military facility, but regretted the lack of identification of the blank samples. This time the identification of blanks had been left to the laboratories, and this precluded their use for testing the recoveries of identified chemicals. On the other hand, the detection of scheduled chemicals in the blanks served to underline the importance of including unidentified blanks among the samples to test for cross-contamination. Inclusion of unidentified blanks among the samples to be delivered to laboratories by the technical secretariat has now been added to the recommended procedures for handling background and control samples.

In this test three laboratories were able to use only one spectrometric technique, and this means that their results do not meet the criteria for unambiguous identification.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

Some laboratories reported mustard degradation products which were not unambiguously identified. This can be considered acceptable as long as the parent schedule 1 compounds, mustard or its derivatives, were unambiguously identified. If only degradation products are found, however, their identification must be unambiguous. Degradation products are of less value for verification than the parent compounds. In this test, reporting of degradation products was considered important since as yet there is no comprehensive list of all degradation products relevant to the future convention.

The third round-robin also underlined the importance of thorough discussons among the experts within a laboratory. Not even three spectrometric techniques are reliable enough if the results are not drawn together for final identification of relevant compounds. One senior person should be responsible for checking the consistency of the results obtained with each technique and for accepting the final report. In the course of the work, the senior person could also ask for more experiments to clarify ambiguities between results obtained by different methods.

Stringent quality control and quality assurance programmes will be extremely important for the future accredited laboratories. Quality control procedures will be required to allow the laboratories to assure the technical secretariat of the accountability and traceability of data. The quality of the reported mass spectrometric data underlined the need for guidelines for data recording and quality control.

In addition to controlling the quality of instrumental methods, it is very important to control the quality of the whole analytical procedure, including sample preparation. Testing of sample preparation methods would reveal any cross-contamination in the laboratory. Correct interpretation of the analytical results is important, as demonstrated by the detection of mustard in samples containing thiodiglycol after their treatment with clorinating agent.

For the first time, false identifications of schedule 1 chemicals were made in the round-robin tests. The reasons for the errors differed for the different compounds and laboratories. For VX and BZ the mass spectra were of poor quality, and although they showed some points in common with the reference spectra of pure VX and BZ, the fit was very poor. Only one spectrometric method was used for identification.

Mustard was erroneously identified by three laboratories in concrete samples. One laboratory reported mustard on the basis of retention data, although no mass spectrometric confirmation was obtained. Another laboratory had probably added chlorinating agent to the samples, resulting in the conversion of thiodiglycol to mustard. For the third laboratory the reason is not clear.

(Mrs. Rautio, Finland)

Detection of alkyl methylphosphonates and thiodiglycol at trace level in many of the blanks and spiked samples points out the danger of cross-contamination in the laboratory. One laboratory unambiguously identified methylphosphonic acid and methyl methylphosphonate in the blank concrete sample. Cross-contamination in the laboratory was eliminated by checking all solvents, reagents and glassware. Methyl methylphosphonate was not present in the laboratory as a reference compound. The origin of the chemicals in the blank remained unclear.

The analytical part of the "rolling text" of recommended operating procedures was enlarged by several new methods. New procedures were compiled for tasks related to the written study on sampling and transportation of samples. Some of these new procedures incited considerable discussion between the laboratories, and compromises, for example, in sampling procedures, have been made for practical reasons. The new procedures should help the future technical secretariat in the planning of its first inspections.

Round-robin 3 revealed the need of the future technical secretariat for many accredited laboratories. Laboratories may not be available for analyses at all times. Down time for equipment failure or installation of new units, sickness or departure of key scientists, and too tight a work schedule - all these are normal occurrences in analytical laboratories. A network of laboratories would enable the technical secretariat to select for a particular task those laboratories that can perform the task reliably and quickly.

This test also showed the necessity for an accreditation process. New laboratories should be accredited only after their performance has been tested and approved. Laboratories must be equipped with instruments allowing unambiguous identification, skilled analysts must be available, and quality control procedures must be implemented.

Concrete, paint, and rubber were shown to be good sample matrices for verification analysis because mustard agents and related degradation products can be isolated and identified from these matrices. Sample preparation does not require overly complex methods, so these matrices are also feasible for on-site use. The test showed that on-site analysis would have identified samples that required confirmatory analyses in off-site laboratories. In this case the spiking chemicals were relatively stable in the selected matrices and were easily detected even three to five weeks after preparation of the actual samples.

The detection of false positive chemicals emphasizes the importance of accepted identification criteria, quality control and quality assurance procedures, and interpretation of data. Solving the problems of transportation of toxic chemicals will require further negotiations with authorities responsible for the safety of air traffic.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Rautio, the representative of Finland, for her statement and the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar, Ambassador Hlaing.

Mr. HLAING (Myanmar): Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to offer you our warmest congratulations on behalf of my delegation as well as on my own on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this month. Your vast experience and extensive expertise in the field of disarmament will go a long way in guiding the negotiations in the CD to a successful outcome. Australia has made considerable contributions in our negotiations on a CWC. Your assumption of the presidency during this crucial phase of negotiations will provide an added impetus to the early conclusion of a CWC. May I also express our deep appreciation to your predecessor Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, for the skilful and effective manner in which he steered the work of the CD during the tenure of his presidency? My delegation would like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Dr. Edmundo Vargas, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Chile, who has honoured us to address the CD despite his manifold duties. His statement contained important points to which my delegation listened with great interest. May I take this opportunity to welcome to our midst Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan and Ambassador Sir Michael Weston of the United Kingdom, who have recently joined us in the CD? Ambassador Dr. Juraj Králik of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Dr. Warnasena Rasaputram of Sri Lanka have just taken leave of us to assume other important responsibilities, and we wish them every success in their new endeavours. Our good wishes also go to Ambassador Dhanapala, who is leaving UNIDIR to rejoin the Sri Lankan Foreign Service. We wish him further success. My delegation also takes pleasure in conveying our warmest congratulations to Ambassador Berasategui on his recent appointment as the Secretary-General of the CD. Ambassador Berasategui is an epitome of the competence and continuity which have always characterized the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

This year 1992 is a landmark year for chemical weapons. Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/35 C, we in the CD are currently concentrating our efforts on CW negotiations with a view to achieving a final agreement on CW convention before the end of this year. Accordingly, I should like to devote my statement today to chemical weapons. One cannot talk about the current negotiations on a CWC without recognizing the significant and substantial contribution made by Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany to the work of tne Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in his capacity as its Chairman. His breadth of vision, his tireless efforts and his pragmatic approach to negotiations combined with his sense of humour have contributed to much progress in our negotiations. Our tribute also goes to other distinguished members of the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee for their invaluable inputs in this crucial stage of negotiations on a CWC.

Progress being made in the CD towards the conclusion of a CWC is being followed with great interest and high expectations by the international community. Since the conclusion of the ENMOD Convention in 1977, the CD has not been able to produce a concrete multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreement through those 15 long years. The successful conclusion of a CWC at this juncture will give a great impetus to the role of

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

multilateralism in the field of disarmament in the post-cold-war era. The urgent need for a successful conclusion of a CWC cannot therefore be overemphasized. It must, however, be stressed that quality should not be sacrificed for the sake of speed, and that it is essential to produce a really good convention which will ensure universal adherence.

In this crucial final phase of CW negotiations in the past few weeks a great many delegations have taken an active part in the negotiations and a number of them have come forward with concrete proposals and alternative forumations which prove to be helpful in our movement forward. Among the concrete proposals placed on the table are the amendment proposals put forward by a group of 12 developing countries, including my own, contained in working papers CD/CW/WP.402 through 409. May I take this opportunity to reaffirm here that these amendment proposals from G.12 are intended to quicken the momentum of rapid progress towards the early conclusion of a CWC? These amendment proposals are offered in a genuinely constructive spirit; and are aimed at facilitating the successful and expeditious conclusion of such a CWC.

During the continuous and intensive negotiations on the basis of the amendment proposals by G.12 from 9 to 19 June several delegations made invaluable contributions. However, these negotiations have not been able so far to produce agreed texts in certain areas; and differences still remain in the positions of delegations on some key issues.

At the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on 22 June, the Chairman of the Committee Ambassador von Wagner presented a revised text of the draft convention (CD/CW/WP.400/Rev.1). We owe our thanks to the Chairman of the Committee and members of his delegation for having done a difficult task in such a short time.

The ban on the use of chemical weapons has been only a partial one under the 1925 Geneva Protocol owing to the reservations made by a number of States parties. My delegation is gratified to note that the legal regime for banning the use of CW will be further strengthened to cover the whole gamut under the future CW convention by making its prohibition complete and without any exception under article I. We subscribe to the view that the future CW convention should not, however, preclude the legitimate non-hostile uses of herbicides and riot control agents which do not come under the definition of chemical weapons. We are happy to observe that this point of view will be reflected in the future CWC, following the agreement among the delegations on this issue.

The question of the composition of the executive council under article VIII is a matter of great importance and much interest to many delegations in the CD. My delegation has expressed its view on this matter in the Working Group. While recognizing the relevance of an industrial criterion, we feel that the time-honoured principle of equitable geographical distribution should form the main basis for the composition of the executive council. My delegation attaches immense importance to the principle of rotation among

(Mr. Hlaing, Myanmar)

States parties and has proposed that this principle be reflected as one of the guidelines for election to the executive council. We are happy to see the reflection of this principle in the latest working paper dated 18 June, prepared by the Friend of the Chair Ambassador Tóth.

Last but not least, we warmly applaud the Friend of the Chair on the question of the seat of the future organization, Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, for the commendable manner in which he has accomplished an extremely delicate task. Our warm congratulations go to the Netherlands delegation whose country will now have the honour of playing host to the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

A comprehensive chemical weapons convention will certainly be one of the most significant multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament. Let us make it a realy good convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor? I see Dr. Gaspar of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic.

Mr. GASPAR (Czechoslovakia): I would like to make a brief statement on behalf of the Group of East European and other States on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We consider that the proportion of the votes given for the resoluton 46/38 B during the last General Assembly of the United Nations clearly reflected different views which still exist on this specific question.

We would like to underline that our previously stated understanding of the conclusion reached by the Ad Hoc Committee on the CPD in 1989 on resuming work "with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances are more conducive to making progress in this regard" remains unchanged. However, we do believe that the Conference on Disarmament itself is able to find various appropriate ways for transforming all positive international changes into a constructive process aimed at successful negotiations on multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements in the future.

Mr. FAROUQUE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, my delegation is delighted to see you presiding over this important forum at a time it has to make decisive steps forward on issues of crucial importance to all of us. Sir, you come from a nation with whom Sri Lanka enjoys long-standing close ties and cooperation and bond of friendship. Particularly, being members of the Commonwealth and founder members of the Colombo Plan our two countries have always worked together for the promotion of peace and democracy through disarmament, economic development and technical cooperation. Your diplomatic skills and wide experience and commitment to the cause of disarmament are well known and we wish you every success in your endeavour.

(Mr. Farouque, Sri Lanka)

I also wish to take this opportunity to express our sincere gratitude to your predecessors Ambassador Semichi of Algeria and Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina for the exemplary and excellent manner in which they carried out their mandate with great acceptance by everybody.

My delegation is deeply touched by the kind words of appreciation showered on a fellow-countryman, Ambassador Dhanapala, by you, Sir, and other distinguished delegates. As a representative of Sri Lanka, I should be failing in my duties if I do not respond to your well-deserved tribute to Ambassador Dhanapala. On behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, I wish to place on record our gratitude for those words of appreciation of the work done by Ambassador Dhanapala in his capacity as Director of UNIDIR.

When he was chosen for the post of Director of UNIDIR, Ambassador Dhanapala had already an illustrious career in the Foreign Service of Sri Lanka, to which he is now returning. He needs no introduction to this esteemed body. His close association with disarmament circles and activities has been very well known long before he became the Director of UNIDIR. Sri Lanka is proud that he held this post during a crucial period of time and carried out the responsibilities entrusted to him to the satisfaction of all. It is also heartening to know that he has been held in high esteem by all those whom came to know him for his personal qualities and outstanding professional abilities.

The research work done by UNIDIR under his stewardship has been substantial. It has inspired significant responses generating international cooperation and efforts, however modest they may be, in all disarmament issues. He has enriched and enhanced the image of UNIDIR.

Sir, you expressed your farewell appreciation on a sombre note. On the contrary, my delegation is happy to extend a warm welcome to this home-coming of Ambassador Dhanapala.

I am confident that his knowledge and experience will continue to be available to disarmament work. In the case of Ambassador Dhanapala, we can rest assured that there is no need for any more confidence-building measures to ensure his effective contribution which he can make from Sri Lanka.

In conclusion, my delegation is pleased to convey to the Government of Sri Lanka those words of appreciation addressed to Ambassador Dhanapala by the presidency and other distinguished delegates.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

Mr. HUSSEIN (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, my delegation would like at the outset to avail itself of this opportunity to express to you our congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to wish you every success in carrying out your noble task. Your experience and competence will undoubtedly ensure the success of the Conference's work at this crucial juncture.

My delegation would like to make a short statement concerning what was said by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran at this Conference. Unfortunately, an important part of his statement fell beyond the scope of the Conference's work. The representatives of Iran unfortunately are in the habit of making use of such conferences for purposes of propaganda, trying to belittle the intelligence of their members by giving false interpretations of events. The statement made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran actually represents an attempt by the Iranian regime to divert attention from its armament programmes and to cover up its intensive and large-scale armament activities by various means. We do not, in this connection, wish to raise the question of the secret arms deals with the United States and the countries which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Iranian regime mentioned, or the question of Israel's involvement in those deals. We shall merely refer to what the Secretary of State of the United States said to the New York Times on 8 December 1991, to the effect that the United States had rendered Israel a service by allowing it to sell weapons to Iran in 1981 and 1982.

The statement made by the Secretary of State of the United States exposed the attempted deception on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran when he spoke of the obstacles impeding accession by the Middle East countries to the chemical weapons convention. The problem of security in our region, to which the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs also referred, can be solved only by adopting uniform criteria, by creating confidence based on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, by respecting the aspirations of the peoples of the region to self-determination, by renouncing the selective application of international law and by recognizing the need for all the countries of the region to participate in guaranteeing its security. The attempt to isolate some of the main protagonists in the Gulf is only part of a scheme which is being pursued by the United States in one way or another; a scheme which is well known to all countries, including Iran.

To bewail the credibility of the Security Council in regard to the implementation of its resolutions is inconsistent with the well-known past record of Iran, which refused to accept Security Council resolution 598 (1987). Iran is still obstructing the application of this resolution as an integrated and cohesive peace plan because the real policy of Iran is not a policy which seeks genuine peace based on justice and international law. This attitude is also inconsistent with Iran's violation of that resolution by refusing to return the Iraqi prisoners of war who have been held captive for more than 10 years in spite of the cessation of military operations on 20 August 1988 and in spite of Iran's involvement in the dispatch of subversive groups to

(Mr. Hussein, Iraq)

Iraq and the mob violence and political disturbances that it incited after the end of the military aggression in March 1991. Moreover, Iranian military aircraft carried out air raids on Iraqi territory on 5 April 1992.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, when he spoke of the credibility of the Security Council, should have referred to the fact that the Security Council did not take any measure to call Israel to account or punish it when it committed a blatant act of aggression in 1981 against the Iraqi nuclear reactor which was intended solely for peaceful purposes. At that time, the Security Council remained silent on the question of Israel's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programmes. He should also have referred to the double standards applied by the Council when it formulated a systematic policy for the destruction of Iraq's economic structure and weapons.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to remind the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the maxim that "persons living in glass houses should not throw stones at others".

Mr. RANJABAR (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, first of all, allow me to express my congratulations on your assumption as the President of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial stage. What I want to say is just to advise the distinguished delegate of Iraq to refer to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. I would just like to mention that this statement is composed of three parts; first, nuclear disarmament, then chemical weapons disarmament and third, transparency in armaments. All those parts should be studied in a very compound basis. And the other point we should like to emphasize is the fact that Iraq invaded Iran. This is undeniable and has already been established by the United Nations Organization. This fact anyhow is beyond any argument. On the question of air attack on Iraqi territory which the distinguished representative of Iraq right now pointed out, I shall say that this question concerns the mujahidin who had invaded the Iran border several times. This terrorist group was supported by Iraq and now also this group is being supported by the Iraqi regime. It was just a short response to the invasion by the terrorist group of the cities of Iran.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I am reminded of the story of the father who sees his 10-year old son come home, obviously bruised and beaten, and he's been in a bit of a fight. The father decides to sit down and say to the boy, "Let's discuss this man to man. Tell me exactly what happened." And the boy says, "Well, Dad, it all started when the other fellow hit me back." The statements about the United States of America by the representative of the pariah regime in Baghdad, to use Brian Mulroney's words, are ludicrous and laughable.

The PRESIDENT: I hope that, as my predecessor commented last week, we can avoid as much as possible repeated statements on matters which are not directly related to the responsibilities of this negotiating body. In accordance with that principle, I shall consider the discussion ended at this stage and proceed to other business.

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the third party of the annual session. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. This might indeed prove to be the case, as new developments between now and then may require some adjustments or additional details. This could apply, for example, to our work on chemical weapons and also to the consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly. In connection with this question, the secretariat will circulate, during the recess, draft substantive paragraphs on agenda items 3, 7, 8 and 9, as well as the technical parts of the draft report. You will also notice that I have scheduled an informal meeting on the question of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This is in implementation of the agreement reached at the very opening of the annual session to discuss this matter in that framework, in order to respond to the request made to the Conference by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/116 O. If there is no objection, I suggest that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As I announced at the outset of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of item 3 of the agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

I have no further business, and unless any other delegation wishes to speak, I shall adjourn the plenary session. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 23 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.